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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF LIBEL:
IMPACT OF THE NEW YORK TIMES RULE
ARnm B. HANSON*
More than two years have passed since the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in New York Times v. Sullivanz.' Unquestionably, the
most important developments in the law of libel during this period are
those exploring the implications of the rule laid down in that case. While
it is too early to tell the ultimate effects of the First Amendment's impact on the law of libel, it is already clear that these effects will be widespread and that requirements of free speech, as announced by the Supreme Court, are already being weighed in decisions far removed from
the criticism of public officials. 2
IIn New York Times, you will recall, the Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment
... prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a de-

famatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.3
The subject of that dispute was a full page advertisement in the New
York Times paid by the "Committee to Defend Martin Luther King
and the Struggle for Freedom in the South." The introductory paragraphs of the advertisement contained several passages inaccurately describing repressive actions taken by the police of Montgomery, Alabama,
against student civil rights demonstrations. Claiming that this material
referred to him, and was libelous, the Commissioner of Public Affairs
in Montgomery, who had supervision of the police department, brought
suit. A jury in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County found that
the words did. in fact refer to the Commissioner, and awarded damages
of $500,000. In view of the climate of opinion in Alabama at that time,
* Of the D. C., Md. and Va, Bars; College of William and Mary B.A. (1939);
B.C.. (1940). General Counsel, American Newspaper Publishers Assn.
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 (1964).
2. See, e.g., Lulay v. Peoria Journal Star,--NE.2d--(Ill. 1966), citing New York Times
in basing privilege to report restaurant's difficulties with health department on free
speech requirements.
3. Supra Note 1, at 279-80.
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such damages must be considered somewhat excessive, but the judgment
4
was affirmed by the state supreme court.
The Supreme Court's reversal rewrote an important segment of the
law of libel. Up to this time, the majority rule permitted defamatory
statements about public officials only in the case of statements of opinion.
This was, of course, known as the "fair comment" rule, and applied
equally to criticisms of government officials, public personalities, and
works of art. Any untrue and defamatory statement of fact remained
actionable, no matter how public the position of the person libelled.
This was the law applied by the courts of Alabama, and those of threefourths of the states in the United States."
A minority view, however, was also extant, which gave some consideration to the special requirements of free speech under our Constitution. Under this rule, any defamatory statement, whether of opinion
or untrue fact, was privileged if it referred to a public official, and
could be the subject of a libel action only if published with actual
malice." While dicta have indicated that the rule has the same application as the "fair comment" rule,7 it seems to have been applied only to
public officials and candidates, and has come to be known as the "public
official" rule.
As regards public officials, it is now settled that neither of these rules
remains applicable. The New York Times decision specifically applied
to misstatements of fact,8 thus eliminating the difficult and unsatisfactory
distinctions between fact and opinion which had plagued the "fair
comment" rule. Any untrue defamatory statement, whether of fact
or opinion, is now privileged unless made with "actual malice."
But the actual malice defined by the Supreme Court in the New York
Times case is essentially a new and technical concept, and bears little
relation to the malice which defeated the privilege under the old "public
official" rule. That privilege, like other qualified privileges, could be
overcome by a showing of ill will, or purpose other than that protected
by the privilege. 9 As interpreted in New York Times, the First Amendment protects any defamatory statement unless made "with knowledge
4. 273 Ala. 656, 144 So.2d 25 (1962).

5. See 1 HARPa & JAMEs, TORTS § 5.28 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 812-16 (3d ed. 1964).
6. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908); PROSSER, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 814.
7. See Coleman v. MacLennan, supra note 6, at 285.
8. The Court noted with approval the idea that "erroneous statement is inevitable in
free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have
the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive.'" 376 US. at 271-72.
9. See, I HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 5.
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that it was false or with reckless disregard whether it was false or not." '0
Motivation is thus removed from the picture, and so defined, the state
of mind required bears closer relation to scienter than to actual malice.
In Garrison v. Louisiana," the requirements of freedom of speech
received further elucidation in at least two important areas. Garrison
was a Louisiana district attorney who was convicted of criminal libel
for criticizing the judges of his parish as "vacation minded" and subject
to "racketeer influences." Like the majority of state criminal libel
statutes," Louisiana punished all publications of defamatory matter
made with malice-that is, with ill-will-whether or not the statement
was true or false.'8 If it was false, malice was presumed, and the defendant had the burden of proving good motives; if it was true, ill-will
had to be proved by the state.
In reversing Garrison's conviction, the Supreme Court logically extended to criminal libel the New York Times privilege and the protection of the First Amendment. The Court properly refused to
recognize any purposes in criminal libel which might require a different
interpretation of that amendment. If civil actions by defamed public
officials are prohibited, a fortiori, criminal prosecutions are to be condemned.' 4 Thus, "intent merely to inflict harm" was held insufficient
to support a criminal prosecution for defamation of a public official,' "
and only false statements made with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard of the truth remain actionable as without constitutional
protection.
What state of mind will dispel the privilege was also clarified in
Garrison. It became more clear than ever that intent and motivation
are immaterial to the protection of the First Amendment, but only
"malice" as defined in New York Times, may cause liability. Actual
knowledge of falsity is, of course, clear.enough. But how may reckless
disregard of truth or falsity be established? The Court in Garrison
emphasized that it was not merely a lack of ordinary care, as was
sufficient under the old reasonable-belief-in-truth tests. " In New York
Times, the Court had held that the publisher's failure to examine readily
available files in its possession was not such reckless disregard. Thus, in
10. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
11. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
12. Id., at 71, n. 7.
13. 14 LA. REv. STAT. §§ 47-50 (1950).

14. Cf. 376 U.S. at 277.

15. See 379 U.S. at 73.
16. Id. at 79.
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Garrison,the Court stated that ". .. only those false statements made
with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded
by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal
sanctions." 17 This language, in addition to the factual holding of New
York Times, suggests that only actual knowledge of probable falsity
raises any duty to investigate the truth of statements relating to public
officials. Absent such suspicion, the publisher is entitled to present the
public with all political information of which it becomes aware.
But it may not be necessary that the actual contents of the publisher's
mind be proved in order for the privilege to be dispelled., Two recent
decisions of federal courts have held that "malice"-that is, awareness
of falsity or probable falsity-may be implied. In one, 18 a magazine had
stated that a Commission's Report had given as fact, what the Report
really only said was alleged by a complainant in a civil suit. The Fifth
Circuit held that if the conduct charged was defamatory, reporting it
as a fact found by the Commission, rather than as a mere allegation in a
civil suit, could very much change the impact on the average reader.
Such rewording, the court held, could constitute reckless disregard for
truth or falsity, thus rebutting the New York Times privilege.
In the other case, now on appeal from the District Court for the
District of Columbia,' 9 malice was implied from the content of the
language itself. The plaintiff was a member of Congress from the
State of New York. Confronted with affidavits of the employees of the
Washington Post, publisher of the allegedly libellous article, stating
that each man "had no reason to believe or evidence causing me to
suspect that the Drew Pearson articles... contained any untrue fact
statements," the Congressman asserted nevertheless that the Post had
acted with reckless disregard of the truth. The court denied defendant's
motion for summary judgment. With the following language, the
court held that "malice," as defined by the New York Times case,
could be implied from the face of the publication:
As defamatory statements become more and more vindictive, cruel
and scandalous, they increasingly give cause to the printer and
publisher to take care. He who tends to disregard the vengeful
nature of his printing, tends to recklessly have disregard for the
truth.2 0
17. Id. at 74.
18. Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1965).
19. Keogh v. Pearson, 244 F. Supp. 482 (D.D.C. 1965), appeal docketed, No. 19668,
D.C. Cir., Sept. 3, 1965.
20. Id., at 485.
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Such a rule appears inconsistent with Garrison'srequirements that actionable statements must have been "made with a high degree of
awareness of their probable falsity." Virulent language does not always
indicate falsity. In New York Times, the Supreme Court spoke of a
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials."21
One may expect in the future, therefore, that the proof required
to establish the publisher's scienter will be as weighty as interference
with freedoms so important as those protected by the First Amendment
would demand.
Of crucial importance to future litigation in this field is the question,
to what persons does the rule apply? The Supreme Court in New York
Times specifically included all public officials within the rule. But by
means of the oft-quoted Footnote 23, the Court avoided two important
questions: who is a public official, and to what other categories of
persons does the public interest in free debate extend the rule? 22 Both
of these questions, however, have received some subsequent attention
from that Court.
In Rosenblatt v.Baer,2 the Supreme Court held that criticism of the
performance of a former supervisor of a county recreation area might
be constitutionally protected. On its face the newspaper column, which
contrasted the current success of the area with the questionable losses
of the past,, had contained "only an impersonal discussion of government activity." 24 The Court rejected a suggestion that state laws might
be used to determine who was a public official, and stated
that the "public official" designation applies at the very least to those
among the hierarchy of government employees who bave, or appear
to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the
conduct of governmental affairs.2
21. 376 U.S. at 270.

22.

We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranls of
government employers the "public official" designation would extend for purposes
of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would
not be included.
Id., at 283, n. 23.
23. 34 U.SL. Week 4111 (February 21, 1966).
24. In an alternative holding, the Court held that the trial judge's instructions were

erroneous in permitting recovery without proof of specific reference to the plaintiff as

an individual, and not just one of the body administering the area.
25. Id., at 4114.
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Furthermore it was for the trial judge in the first instance to determine
whether the facts show the defendant to be a public official or not.2"
But to what circumstances and persons other than "public officials"
the constitutional protection applies remains in a state of considerable
controversy. That the protection has other applications is now settled
by Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114.1 In that case, the Supreme
Court relied on section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley! Act to indicate "a
congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor
and management." 28 Thus, "actual malice" was held to be an essential
element in a libel action brought by a company official against a union
for defamatory statements made during a union organizing campaign.29
Although an important indication of the extensive boundaries of the
rule, the statutory and federal preemption considerations deprive the
Linn case of general application, and the decisions of the lower courts
must also be examined. While their responses have been diverse, making
ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court inevitable, a trend of liberal
extension may be discerned. Judge Friendly, of the Second Circuit,
has remarked:
Although the public official rule is the strongest case for the constitutional compulsion of such a privilege, it is questionable whether
in principle the decision can be so limited. A candidate for public
office would seem an inevitable candidate for extension.... Once that
extension was made, the participant in public debate on an issue of
grave public concern would be next in line.30
Thus, in Walker v. Courier-Journaland Louisuille Times Co.,3 1 the
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky relied upon the
rule to dismiss an action brought by former Major General Edwin A.
Walker, U.S.A., who had been the subject of considerable nationwide
news coverage, both as an Army General, and as a candidate for
Governor of Texas, and had subsequently entered into various controversies on matters of public concern. The court acknowledged
that Walker was not a public official, but held that the New York Times
rule extended to persons of "political prominence," or "public men." 82
26. Id., at 4115.
27. 34 U.S.L. Week 4136 (February 21, 1966).
28. Id., at 4138.

29. Ibid.
30. Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum).
31. 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
32. Id., at 234 ("inescapable conclusion").
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In addition to conceptual interpretation of the New York Times
decision, the court relied on interesting practical considerations, reminiscent of assumption-of-risk theory.3 Walker's suit was based on news
stories carried by defendant's newspapers and television stations, to the
effect that he had participated in the riots incident to the integration
of the University of Mississippi, had led a charge of rioters against
U.S. marshals, and was a troublemaker. The court reasoned that for a
person of Walker's political prominence to go to Oxford at the time
he did was to invite news comment, thus magnifying the chance of
34
inaccurate reporting.
If the reporting complained of did not concern the plaintiff's official
conduct, it clearly concerned conduct which was, and was intended to
be, public conduct. Such conduct must clearly be included in any
rule seeking to protect "uninhibited, robust and wide open" debate
on public issues. A similar result was reached by the Superior Court of
Alaska, which extended the rule to a news columnist. His criticism of
the government was held to place him in a position similar to that of
a public official.35
This broad interpretation of the New York Times rule has been
accepted by other courts which have had occasion to consider the
question. Thus, where a shipping company was charged in a newspaper
article with taking advantage of a legal loophole and shipping goods
to Cuba through the British West Indies, it was held that, even if
libelous, the article dealt with a matter of public concern protected
by the First Amendment.3 The rule has been applied to a policeman
who had shot a boy resisting arrest r Critics supporting a civilian
review board used the occasion to distribute handbills with the policeman's picture inscribed with "Wanted for Murder." The court said
that the rationale of New York Times was to protect debate on public
issues.3 And in another interesting New York case, Gilberg v. Goffi,39
an action was dismissed which had been brought by the partner of a
mayor's law firm. The defendant, a political candidate, had charged
his opponents with not investigating the mayor's firm for conflict of
33. Cf., Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra note 23, 4114, n. 12.
34. Ibid.
35. Pearson v. Fairbanks Pub. Co., 33 U.S.L. Week 2307 (Alaska Super. Ct., Nov.
25, 1964).
36. H. 0. Merren & Co. v. A. H. Belo Corp., 228 F. Supp. 515 (ND. Tex. 1964).
37. Gilligan v. King, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1965).

38. Id., at 313.
39. 21 App. Div.2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964), aff'd 260 N.YS.2d 29, 207 NE2d
620 (1965).
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interests in practice before city courts. The court stated that the mayor's
law firm was a proper subject of public comment, and insofar as he was
a member of that firm, so must be the plaintiff.4"
By no means all opinion, however, is so oriented. The rule has been
held inapplicable to a major league baseball pitcher 41 suing under New
York's right of privacy statute, and to a former heavyweight boxing
champion,4 suing for a charge that he had used loaded gloves in a
championship fight some 45 years before. More significantly, it has
been held inapplicable to a "world famous jurist and educator, having
held academic, government and other posts," and who had signed an
43
open letter condemning this country's Vietnam policy.
Two federal district courts have espoused a narrow interpretation.
In Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co.,44 the rule was not extended to a
Haitian politician, living in exile, whose campaign slogans had been
allegedly misquoted in a magazine article, in such a way as to be defamatory. In Clark v. Pearson," now on appeal, it was held that a
lobbyist, suing for a newspaper column suggesting he had "bought" a
congressman, need not show "malice" as defined in New York Times.
The court stated that the New York Times rule applied to public
officials exclusively, and not to candidates.
It is difficult to imagine such a limitation being adopted by the
Supreme Court. Advocates of the limited view point to the New York
Times case, where the Court specified a desire to make reciprocal the
privilege of public officials to make false statements about members of
the public, so long as such statements were within the outer perimeter
of their duties." Clearly, candidates for public office, and other "public
men" do not have such a privilege.
But reciprocity was only one of several arguments for First Amendment protection, and not the most important one, at that. Time and
again, the Court returned to its basic premise that "debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." In Garrison,
40. 251 N.YS.2d at 831.
41. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc, 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
42. Dempsey v. Time, Inc, 43 Misc. 2d 759, 252 N.YS.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
43. Harper v. National Review, Inc, - N.Y..2d - (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd mem. 263
N.YS.2d 292 (1st Dep't 1965).
44. 247 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
45. 248 F. Supp. 188 (D.D.C. 1965).
46. Such a privilege for criticism of official conduct is appropriately analogous to
the protection accorded a public official when be is sued for libel by a private
citizen.
376 US. at 282.

1966]

IMPACT OF THE N.Y. TINM

RULE

that philosophy was reaffirned, "for speech concerning public affairs
is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." 47
The vigorous and healthy debate of an informed public necessary to a
free society cannot be limited to discussion of "public officials."
An indication of future development may lie in two passages from
Coleman v. MacLennan,48 quoted by the Supreme Court:
Manifestly a candidate for public office must surrender to public
scrutiny and discussion so much of his private character as affects
his fitness for office... 49

This privilege extends to a great variety of subjects and includes
matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office. 0
A rule which protected criticism of persons once elected to office, but
refused to protect statements about such persons before their appointment or election would present a peculiar anomaly indeed!
In concluding a discussion of current trends, it is interesting to note
an increasing number of minimal verdicts in cases which go to judgment
against the defendants. Juries are not readily persuaded of genuine
injury. Where real injury has been recognized however, verdicts in
large amounts have been returned, particularly by way of punitive
damages. The New York Times case was a good example, and a recent
jury in Missouri awarded $1,000 compensatory damages and $50,000
punitive damages. Unlike New York Times, however, the award was
set aside by the trial judge, and is now on appeal. Thus, it appears that
a strong case may be expected to result in a very substantial verdict.
Contrarywise, where the facts are thin, the jury is likely to prove
niggardly.

47.
48.
49.
50.

379 US. at 74-75.
78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
Supra note 11, at 77.
Supra note 1, at 281-82.

